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Abstract
We develop a parsimonious general equilibrium model where agents allocate time across
three activities: production, trade, and leisure. Leisure includes time spent socializing, which
economizes transaction costs. Our framework yields multiple equilibria in terms of the num-
ber of social ties and predicts that the number of social ties is positively associated with
development, a relationship we observe in cross-country data. The model captures additional
dimensions of data, namely: (i) increasing income inequality, but converging growth rates;
(ii) an association between weak social ties and development; and (iii) an association between
number of social ties and size of the transaction sector.
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1 Introduction
The average per capita number of social ties—e.g., friendships or acquaintances—varies significantly
from country to country. More importantly, this variation is positively associated with variation in
income per capita, as shown in figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
This paper asks whether and how the heterogeneity in social ties can account for differences in
economic development. In order to address this question, we construct a general equilibrium model
where the set of goods includes ties between economic agents, where a tie between any two agents
is produced according to a technology that uses scarce time from both parties. The model further
assumes that time spent socializing economizes transaction costs, i.e. there exists a form of social
capital. Our theoretical approach yields the existence of multiple equilibria, each one of them
associated with a specific number of social ties and an equilibrium level of social capital. These
multiple equilibria can be interpreted as rational outcomes in societies with different cultural beliefs,
an approach in the spirit of Krugman (1991), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), and Greif
(1994).
Traditionally social capital has been understood to be a driver of economic performance, with
several authors finding a positive association between the two: Putnam (1993), Knack and Keefer
(1997), and LaPorta et al. (1997), amongst others. What drives this association? To begin with,
we need to define the concept of social capital. Putnam (2000) (pg. 19) does so in the following
way.1
Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties of
individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.
This concept of social capital is also similar to Coleman (1988), who argues that closure (or degree
of connectedness) is the key structural property of a social network in increasing the efficiency of
1For a review and discussion of several perspectives on social capital, see Sobel (2002).
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economic interactions. However, this does not imply that social capital should always be maximized.
For example, Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) and Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) have pointed
out that social capital is not without costs. On one hand social capital is sometimes associated
with unlawful activity; on the other, it may be efficient to incur high transaction costs if it allows
a higher productivity. Moreover, not all types of social capital may benefit the development of
institutions that underpin market economies, as shown by Kumar and Matsusaka (2009). In our
model social capital requires time investment in social interactions; but since time is scarce and has
other uses (e.g. production), it is certainly not the case that the maximum level of social capital is
desirable.
In addition to the ambiguous effect of social capital to economic outcomes, some literature has
pointed out that the term itself is ambiguous; see e.g. Solow (2000) or Arrow (2000). In particular,
it is not clear whether social capital results from a deliberate process of accumulation by economic
agents, or whether it is simply a positive externality from social interactions. We adopt the lat-
ter perspective: in the model social capital is equated to aggregate time spent socializing, which
economizes transaction costs but cannot be materially influenced by any individual agent. Some
economists have explored the connection between social capital as a product of agent-level invest-
ment (i.e. not an externality) and economic performance, namely Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote
(2002), and we view our approach as complementary to this strand of research. Nevertheless, we
discuss explicitly in the paper why we believe that disregarding agent-level social capital is rea-
sonable within the context of our model.2 It is worth mentioning that we do not assume a priori
that a higher level of social ties equates directly to a higher level of social capital. Social capital
corresponds to time spent socializing, which is given by the product of “number of social ties”
(exogenous) times “average time devoted to each tie” (endogenous). In that sense, our model is
contributing towards understanding the sources of social capital, in particular with relation to the
observed cross-country heterogeneity in terms of number of relationships.
The theory predicts a strong association between the number of social ties and economic devel-
opment. The mechanism underlying this result is that in economies with a large number of ties,
2See section 4.
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agents choose high levels of transformational effort, which is required to produce standard com-
modities and can be interpreted as a combination of labor and investment in human capital. In the
model, productivity growth comes from the accumulation of transformational effort over time (may
be interpreted as learning by doing), which implies that higher levels of transformational effort
translate into higher rates of economic development. The reason why high-social-ties economies
choose higher transformational effort can be attributed to two factors. First, it turns out that a
higher number of social ties implies a higher level of equilibrium time spent socializing (for reasons
detailed in the theoretical analysis), which increases trade efficiency and thus creates a higher incen-
tive for production. Second, even in the absence of social capital effects, under conditions we view as
reasonable it is still the case that a larger number of ties induces a higher level of transformational
effort, due to an interplay in preferences between social ties and the consumption of standard goods.
For example, if we shut down transaction costs we find that high-social-ties economies display a
lower equilibrium share of leisure, where the extra time is devoted to production.
We calibrate the model using data for the United States and generate predictions of development
paths for countries with different levels of social ties. The calibrated model generates a cross
section of income per capita in 2000 that correlates strongly with data (at 0.58), and with similar
levels of dispersion. The coefficient of variation in cross-country data is 0.43, while its equivalent
generated by the model is 0.41. Using the calibrated version of the model we also ask the question:
How important are social capital effects in terms of determining the cross-sectional dispersion of
development? We address this question by shutting down the productivity of social capital and
simulating the development path for each country. The coefficient of variation generated by the
model becomes 0.20, which allows us to conclude that social capital effects and preference effects are
equally important. Finally, it is worth referring that the model implies a significantly growing level
of income inequality between countries, which is in line with historical trends: Lucas (2002) reports
a coefficient of variation in income per capita in 1990, for a set of 21 regions, that is approximately
4 times greater than in 1750. This inequality result notwithstanding, the calibrated model predicts
convergence in growth rates, a feature we also observe in cross-country data.
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We regard the result of a strong association between number of social ties and economic devel-
opment as a rationalization of the positive association found between measures of social capital and
economic development in empirical studies mentioned above. The most important contribution of
this paper is to make explicit some possible mechanisms that drive that association.
Social ties and family ties
What exactly is meant by “social ties”? Our cross-country data comes from the International
Social Survey Programme 2001, which contains a collection of several sociometric variables.3 Three
types of ties are covered by that study: nuclear family, close friends, and participation in secondary
associations, such as political parties, neighborhood organizations, etc.4 Figure 1 plots the data on
close friends, which is also what we use in the quantitative exploration of the model. Close friends’
ties correlate strongly with participation in secondary associations (at 0.56) and so we broadly
interpret social ties in the context of our model as non-familial relationships.5
A related strand of research establishes a connection between family ties and economic devel-
opment. For example, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) establish a negative relation between family
ties and political participation, analyzing within-country patterns of immigrant behavior. Lower
political participation, the authors argue, would lead to lower social capital and ultimately impact
development negatively. One prediction of our model supports this argument, since high-social-ties
economies display increased time spent socializing, in part by sacrificing time spent alone. If agents
are interpreted as households, this time could be seen as related to family ties. In our data, family
ties are indeed associated with lower income per capita (correlation coefficient of −0.35).
Another characteristic of social ties is their strength (e.g. amount of time devoted to each
relationship). Our model predicts that countries with more social ties should display lower strength
of ties, which is indeed what we observe in data. Thus there is an indirect relationship between
weak social ties and economic development (in the model and in the data).
3The International Social Survey Programme is a cross-national collaboration initiative in the field of social science.
It evolved from a bilateral cooperation between the ZUMA center in Germany and the University of Chicago.
4See www.issp.org for details.
5An earlier version of the paper also contained a calibration based on the intensity of participation in secondary
associations, with very similar quantitative results.
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Social capital and its productivity
An important feature of our theoretical approach is the way social capital contributes towards
the reduction of transaction costs (trading time in the model). More specifically, per-unit-of-trade
trading time is reduced as a function of the following product:
Bsc,t × Social Capitalt,
where Bsc is the productivity of social capital. If we conceive of social capital as network connected-
ness (which in our simple model corresponds to weighted average degree), making information flow
easier (or lowering monitoring costs),6 then Bsc may be thought of as the institutional/contractual
setting that makes use of such information. It is also clear that we are assuming some form of com-
plementarity between these two dimensions, which we believe is reasonable.7 While social capital
per se is important for development, what also matters is how the productivity of social capital
(Bsc) evolves over time. We adopt a very stark specification for the law of motion of Bsc, where
we assume that it increases linearly over time, at an exogenously given rate.8 This increase in
productivity notwithstanding, trading time does not necessarily converge to zero in the model, even
when social capital remains bounded away from zero. This obtains because with development con-
sumption and trade are also increasing, and social capital is assumed to reduce per-unit-of-trade
transaction costs. The dependence of total transaction costs on trading volume can be interpreted
as an implicit assumption of a positive relation between individual incentives to deceive or expro-
priate and the total return to such behaviors, which would be a function of total trading volume.
This feature of the model allows us to obtain a result that is in line with the empirical findings
of Wallis and North (1986): In the calibrated model, the weight of the transaction sector in the
6We abstract from complex network structure considerations, since we solve for symmetric equilibria (i.e. every
agent displays the same degree).
7In general terms, a contract specifies payoffs that are contingent on the verification of a certain state. The finer
the distinction agents are able to make regarding states, i.e. the more information is available, the more efficient
will contracts become. We abstract from the possibility that a higher level of information may generate additional
incentive problems per se.
8Some authors have modeled the dynamics of “social productivity” more explicitly, namely Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe (1995), Francois and Zabojnik (2005), Tabellini (2008), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008). This is
not the objective of our paper.
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US rises significantly across time (with the caveat that the model does not match the timing and
magnitude of the increase). The model also predicts, for the steady-growth stage, that there should
always exist a positive relationship between the number of social ties and the relative weight of the
transaction sector. We observe this relationship in our cross-country data in 2000, but we do not
fully capture this dimension with our calibration (where not all of the countries are close to the
steady-growth stage in the year 2000).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model setup and derives the theoretical
results regarding short- and long-run impact of social ties to economic growth. Section 3 proposes a
calibration of the model and explores the quantitative implications for a cross section of 27 countries.
Section 4 explores the implications of considering agent-level social capital. Section 5 discusses and
concludes. The Appendix contains details on the derivation of the setup, some proofs, and a section
describing the elaboration of the data plus a table with the explicit numbers.
2 Model
2.1 Static setup
The economy is composed of N agents. Each agent i ∈ {1, ..., N} maximizes the following utility
function
U(ci, si) :=
{
φc
ρc,s
i + (1− φ) [u(si)]ρc,s
} 1
ρc,s , (1)
subject to time and budget constraints, to be defined shortly. The first component of utility ci refers
to the level of consumption of a standard composite good. The second term in (1) is the utility that
the agent derives from social ties (si is the vector of ties). The parameter ρc,s ∈ (−∞, 1) controls
for the elasticity of substitution between tie utility and standard-commodities utility, given by the
ratio 1/(1− ρc,s). We also use a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function for social
ties:
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u(si) :=
(∑
j
sρsij
) 1
ρs
, (2)
with ρs ∈ (0, 1), such that it is admissible for non-existent ties (sij = 0).9 The tie of the individual
with herself (j = i) is part of the utility function too, and we interpret this as non-social leisure.
An important characteristic of this utility function is a preference for variety, and this will bear
significantly in our results.
Each agent produces the composite good. The budget constraint faced by i is
ci ≤ yc,i, (3)
where the price level is normalized to 1. The variable yc,i stands for the supply of the composite
good by i. We do not allow agents to consume from own production; consumed goods need to be
acquired in the marketplace.
There are two agent-level technologies: (i) production of the standard good; and (ii) production
of social ties:
yc,i(ri) := Brri (4)
ys,ij(aij, aji) := a
β
ija
1−β
ji = sij. (5)
The variable ri stands for the time spent by i in the production of the standard good, with produc-
tivity Br. We refer to r as transformational effort, and it is intended to capture a combination of
labor and investment in human capital. Physical capital is omitted from the production function.
The variable aij represents the amount of time invested by i in the tie with j and is controlled by
i. We refer to aij as attention. Social ties are thus produced using two inputs, namely the amount
of time invested by each of the two agents in the tie.
The technology for building social ties in (5) implies that no agent can be forced into a re-
9Here we follow Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), where instead of multiple standard commodities we have multiple
relationships.
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lationship, since she can always set aij = 0. This mechanism of building ties is in the spirit of
game-theoretic literature on network formation, e.g. Jackson and Wolinski (1996) and Bala and
Goyal (2000). If β < 0.5, relationships—from the perspective of the consumer i—rely more heavily
on attention being given by j, the other side of the tie. If β > 0.5, relationships depend mainly
on the attention that the focal agent gives to the other agent. One can thus interpret the level of
the inverse of β as the usual level of egotism displayed by an individual in building relationships
with others. Also note that the individual’s tie with herself is given by aii, independently of β.
Thus aii can be interpreted as leisure associated with spending time alone. This feature is a direct
consequence of assuming a constant-returns-to-scale technology in the production of ties. We will
see that β < 1 leads to a coordination failure in relationship building, a discussion we detail a few
paragraphs below.
In this economy, trading implies transaction costs (TC), which are fully borne by the buyer;
we term this as transactional effort. Transaction costs correspond to time spent trading, and they
depend on the aggregate level of social capital (SC) and the amount of goods acquired:
TCi :=
(
α
1 +BscSC
)
ci, (6)
where α is a scaling constant and Bsc the productivity of social capital. The amount of social capital
corresponds to weighted average degree,10 and it may also be interpreted as the average amount of
time spent socializing:
SC = ysc ({sij}) :=
∑
i
∑
j 6=i sij
N
(7)
We assume that the number of agents is large enough that each agent disregards the consequences
of her own actions in terms of aggregate social capital. In this model social capital is a positive
externality from social relationships.
Time is the only scarce natural resource and the following time constraint must be verified for
10Our concept of social capital is close to Coleman (1988).
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any agent i:
ri + TCi +
∑
j
aij ≤ 1, (8)
where the total amount of time is normalized to 1. Time is thus put into three different uses:
transformational effort, transactional effort, and producing ties.
An equilibrium is characterized by solving all agents’ (constrained) maximization problem, which
immediately implies market clearing, from Walras’ law. We solve for a symmetric equilibrium and
details are presented in the Appendix. A key feature of the model is that any number of ties is
sustainable in equilibrium. The intuition is that i will not pay attention to someone from whom she
does not receive attention, and this is an equilibrium. It is important to emphasize that if agent j
sets aji = 0, aij = 0 is strictly a better response than aij > 0 for agent i. This is so because time is
valuable and aij > 0 per se translates into a zero increase to the utility of agent i.
The existence and uniqueness results are contained in the following proposition, proved in the
Appendix. The proposition also contains some mathematical relations that will be used in subse-
quent sections.
Proposition 1 Considering a fixed number of social ties F for all agents, then there exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium, for any such F , where a positive amount of time is devoted to each tie, as
long as φ < 1 and β > 0. The optimal level of attention paid to each tie, a1, is not given in
closed-form in the general case. The remaining equilibrium magnitudes, as a function of a1, are
given below:
r =
(1 +BscFa1)
{
1− a1
[(
1
β
) 1
1−ρs
+ F
]}
1 +BscFa1 + αBr
(9)
c = Brr =
Br(1 +BscFa1)
{
1− a1
[(
1
β
) 1
1−ρs
+ F
]}
1 +BscFa1 + αBr
(10)
a0 = a1
(
1
β
) 1
1−ρs
, (11)
where a0 is the equilibrium time spent alone.
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An immediate consequence of our approach to modeling ties/leisure is that time spent alone is
always higher than time devoted to any other tie, as long as β < 1 (see equation (11)). This
gap is driven by a coordination failure (or under-investment problem) in relationship building,
which obtains because individual agents are only able to partially influence the level of bilateral
relationships (recall: time from both sides of a tie is required to produce a relationship). The gap
between time spent alone and social ties is smaller if the agent has a strong preference for variety,
i.e. if ρs is low, which is intuitive. When β → 1, coordination failure in relationship building
disappears and a0 → a1. This obtains because agents fully control the level of any “relationship”,
where this concept degenerates to unilaterally paying attention to others.11
It is useful to derive the solution to two particular cases of the model, which will be used in
subsequent sections. The proof may be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Two particular cases yield a closed-form solution for a1:
1. If there are no transaction costs, i.e. α = 0, then
a1 =


φB
ρc,s
r
(1− φ)β
[(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
+ F
] ρc,s
ρs
−1

1
1−ρc,s
+
[(
1
β
) 1
1−ρs
+ F
]
−1
. (12)
2. If the elasticity of substitution between standard commodities and ties is unitary, i.e. ρc,s = 0,
then
a1 =
(1− φ)β
F [φ+ (1− φ)β] +
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
. (13)
2.2 Dynamics
Each agent lives one period and maximizes a combination of her own lifetime utility plus the
discounted utility of her progeny. Agent i’s total indirect utility at t is denoted by Ji (we assume
11In rigor, β = 1 implies that equilibria with F < N no longer exist, since with preference for variety and full
control of social ties, every agent would optimally pay some attention to every other agent in the economy.
10
all decisions are made at t):
Ji(Br,t, Bsc,t) = max {Ui(ci, si;Br,t, Bsc,t) + γJi′(Br,t+1, Bsc,t+1)} , (14)
where for notational economy we omitted dependence of utility on other parameters besides pro-
ductivities Br and Bsc (the state variables). We assume these other parameters are fixed across
time. The label i′ denotes agent i’s progeny; γ is the discount factor. We specify the laws of motion
for productivities in the following way.
Br,t+1 = Br,t
(
1 + ψr
∑
i
ri,t
N
)
(15)
Bsc,t+1 = Bsc,t (1 + ψs) , (16)
where the ψ ≥ 0 parameters measure the speed at which each productivity increases. An interpre-
tation for the law of motion for transformational productivity is that agents learn by doing (hence
the dependence on transformational effort), and cannot be excluded from knowledge (hence trans-
formational productivity not being agent-specific). Naturally this implies that for large N , agents
cannot materially influence the utility of their progeny (note that the upper bound for r is 1),
and our dynamic model reduces to a repetition of the static optimization and equilibrium problem,
only with an endogenous evolution of productivity Br. In particular, we still solve for a symmetric
equilibrium at each stage, so the law of motion for Br reduces to
Br,t+1 = Br,t (1 + ψrrt) . (17)
The evolution of Bsc is fully exogenous given the low a priori guidance we have regarding the changes
in social capital productivity. Nonetheless, ψs will be shown to be an important determinant of
growth and other characteristics of the economy (e.g. the size of the transaction sector). An
illustration of the increase in the productivity of social capital would be the efficiency of the judicial
system. The judicial system makes use of information provided via social contacts (e.g. a witness
X of contract breach between Z and Y), and it seems reasonable to consider that the efficiency of
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the judicial system has increased over time. But, what exactly drove the increase in this efficiency?
Perhaps in part it is the intensity of information flow that allows some form of learning, as we
assume happens with transformational productivity; in which case the law of motion for Bsc would
depend on the level of contemporaneous social capital. However, a similar argument could be made
for the intensity of trading activity. Finally, improvements in transformational productivity (e.g.
information technology) certainly also contribute towards efficiency gains in the judicial system.
The point we wish to make with this illustration is that it is not clear whether different allocations
of time in terms of trading, socializing, and producing—arising from different F ’s in our model—
should be assumed to lead to different outcomes in terms of the dynamics of the overall return to the
information provided by social contacts. Therefore, we feel somewhat justified in our assumption
of an exogenously specified law of motion for Bsc.
2.3 Mechanisms in the static economy
This section shows the two main broad implications of the model in terms of the short-run associa-
tion between social ties and development. First, if transaction costs are absent (α = 0), thus making
social capital irrelevant for development, transformational effort for high-social-ties economies is
generally larger, ceteris paribus (sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). This translates into a higher increase in
next-period transformational productivity, as specified by the law of motion (17). Second, if trans-
action costs are positive (α > 0) and the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption
is unitary, then an increase in the number of social ties F corresponds to an increase in equilibrium
social capital (or time spent socializing) Fa1. The higher equilibrium trade efficiency will in turn
create a higher incentive for transformational effort r, ceteris paribus (section 2.3.3).
The arguments above notwithstanding, dynamics will introduce endogenous heterogeneity in
economies with different F , since Br and Bsc are changing. Whether and how variation in F
impacts long-run output growth is postponed until section 2.4.
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2.3.1 Elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption
We first set α = 0 (no trading costs) and β = 1, and we show that the sign of ρc,s determines the
equilibrium relationship between the number of social ties F and transformational effort r. Note
that if a relation does arise, it will be strictly related to preference motives. Considering β < 1
introduces a different source through which F affects r, but we postpone this until section 2.3.2.
The following proposition contains the main result of this section.
Proposition 3 Considering α = 0 and β = 1, equilibrium transformational effort is given by
r =
[(
φ
1−φ
)
B
ρc,s
r
] 1
1−ρc,s[(
φ
1−φ
)
B
ρc,s
r
] 1
1−ρc,s
+ (1 + F )
ρc,s(1−ρs)
ρs(1−ρc,s)
, (18)
which implies
∂r
∂F
> 0⇔ ρc,s < 0. (19)
The proposition follows directly from setting β = 1 and α = 0 in equations (9) and (12), so a
detailed proof is omitted. When ρc,s < 0, this means that consumption of standard commodities
and (utility from) social ties (or “total leisure”) are complementary. Also, given the agent’s taste for
variety (recall, ρs < 1), an increase in F must leave the agent better off. Even if the relative share of
time devoted to leisure was not revised after an increase in F , a simple proportional redistribution
of total leisure time would increase total utility. Given the complementarity of leisure utility and
consumption, the agent would however prefer to slightly adjust the level of the latter upwards. In
order to achieve this, she sacrifices part of the leisure time and increases transformational effort,
which ultimately is required to acquire standard commodities.
Whether or not leisure and consumption are complementary is an empirical question. We present
some arguments in section 2.4.3 for why excluding ρc,s > 0 is reasonable, at least within the strict
context of this model.
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2.3.2 Coordination failure in relationship building
It turns out that less-than-perfect coordination creates a channel through which the number of
social ties influences equilibrium transformational effort. We shut down the channels related to
complementarity between leisure and consumption (setting ρc,s = 0) and social capital (setting
α = 0), in order to isolate the effect of β.
Proposition 4 Considering α = 0 and ρc,s = 0, equilibrium transformational effort is given by
r =
1 + (1− φ)
(
1 + Fβ
1
1−ρs
)
φ
(
1 + Fβ
ρs
1−ρs
)
−1 , (20)
which implies
∂r
∂F
> 0,
as long as β < 1.
The proposition follows directly from setting α = 0 in equations (9) and (13), so a detailed proof
is omitted. To understand the intuition behind the result, assume for a moment that non-social
leisure is not allowed. In this case the utility function for social ties becomes
u(si) =
(∑
j 6=i
sρsij
) 1
ρs
. (21)
Let us assume that agent i already anticipates a symmetric attention from all her ties (denoted by
a¯); and also a non-discriminant response from herself, such that aij = a
∗. Using (5), (21) becomes
u(si) =
[∑
j 6=i
(
(a∗)β(a¯)1−β
)ρs] 1ρs
=
[∑
j 6=i
(a∗)ρsβ(a¯)ρs(1−β)
] 1
ρs
=
[
(a∗)ρsβF (a¯)ρs(1−β)
] 1
ρs
= (a∗)βF
1
ρs (a¯)(1−β). (22)
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We can then write the total utility function, which in this case is Cobb-Douglas (recall that ρc,s = 0),
as
U (ci, si) = cφi (u(si))1−φ
= cφi (a
∗)β(1−φ) × F (1−φ)ρs (a¯)(1−β)(1−φ). (23)
The terms after the multiplication sign in equation (23) do not influence the marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption. It is then straightforward to show that the share of
leisure is
β(1− φ)
φ+ β(1− φ) , (24)
and not (1− φ), as it would be in the standard neoclassical model. In short, in a setting where all
leisure comes from social ties, as β decreases so does the equilibrium share of leisure. This takes
place because of the weak control that agents have over the level of consumed relationships sij,
whenever β is small. Since time is devoted either to leisure or transformational effort (recall: α = 0,
i.e. there are no transaction costs), a reduction in leisure increases r.
If instead we were to not allow ties with other agents (by setting F = 0), then leisure would
simply correspond to a0, and it would have a share of (1− φ). In the general version of the model,
the equilibrium share of leisure is indeed a combination of these two cases (since there is both social
and non-social leisure), as a function of whether leisure comes mostly from social ties or not. The
weights in this combination are determined by F , where a high F brings us closer to the case where
there is only social leisure, and thus its share is relatively small. In fact, the share of leisure when
F →∞ converges to (24):
lim
F→∞
a0 + Fa1 = lim
F→∞
1− r
= 1− lim
F→∞
1 + (1− φ)
(
1 + Fβ
1
1−ρs
)
φ
(
1 + Fβ
ρs
1−ρs
)
−1
=
β(1− φ)
φ+ β(1− φ) . (25)
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2.3.3 Social capital
In order to acquire standard commodities, agents incur transaction costs; which in turn are a
function of social capital. Equilibrium social capital (Fa1) is a function of both the number of
social ties (F ) and the time devoted to each tie (a1). It turns out that equilibrium social capital
increases with F , at least if the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is unitary.
The higher level of trade efficiency increases equilibrium transformational effort r, which implies a
higher growth of transformational productivity Br. The proposition below makes these arguments
formally precise. The channel related to coordination failure in relationship building is shut down;
as well as the channel related to the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption.
Proposition 5 Considering ρc,s = 0 and β = 1,
r =
φ
1 +
(
αBr
1+BscFa1
) (26)
Fa1 =
1− φ
1 + 1
F
, (27)
therefore
∂(Fa1)
∂F
> 0 and
∂r
∂F
> 0,
whenever α > 0.
The proposition follows directly from setting β = 1 in equations (9) and (13), so a detailed proof
is omitted. The mechanism underlying the result above is that with higher F agents now spend
more time socializing, relative to time spent alone. In fact, since ρc,s = 0 (Cobb-Douglas case) and
(a0 + Fa1) is total leisure, with β = 1 it will have a constant share of (1 − φ). Given that β = 1,
then as F increases so too does Fa1 (note that a0 = a1 with β = 1). This increase in Fa1—i.e.
time spent socializing—takes place at the expense of time spent alone, a0.
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If we relax the assumption of β = 1, then the effect described above and the one described in
section 2.3.2 reinforce each other. To see this note that with β < 1 and ρc,s = 0 we can write
r =
 1
1 +
(
αBr
1+BscFa1
)
 [1− (a0 + Fa1)] (28)
Fa1 =
(1− φ)β
[φ+ (1− φ)β] + 1
F
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
, (29)
where (a0+Fa1) does not depend on α, given the unitary elasticity of substitution between standard
commodities and total leisure. In proposition 4 (where α was set to zero), we proved that ∂r/∂F >
0, but in this special case, r is equal to 1 − (a0 + Fa1). Thus, we have indirectly shown that
∂(a0+Fa1)/∂F < 0 for any α. Also, equation (29) shows that it is still the case that ∂(Fa1)/∂F > 0,
as in proposition 5. Thus, as F increases, the incentive to exert more transformational effort because
of higher trade efficiency compounds with the incentive to spend less time in total leisure (or total
ties).
2.4 Analysis of steady growth
In this section we will restrict ourselves to studying a subclass of the economies generated by the
model. In particular, we are interested in economies with the following two characteristics in terms
of the steady-growth stage, which a priori seem reasonable to us, especially in light of empirical
evidence:12
1. Non-vanishing leisure;
2. Non-vanishing output growth.
In the model, output per capita is given by
GDP = Br (r + TC) . (30)
12See section 3 for details.
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The expression for GDP can be interpreted in the following intuitive way. Total output is the
outcome of agents spending (r+ TC) time in raw production, obtaining the quantity in expression
(30), which follows from our assumption about the production technology of the standard good
given in equation (5). The quantity BrTC is lost as iceberg (trading) costs and agents end up
with consumption c = Brr. The relative share of the transformational sector with respect to the
transactions’ sector is thus given by r/TC. In a steady-growth stage of development, r and TC
become constant, hence GDP growth is given by variation in Br. According to our specification
(17), this implies that steady-growth rates are simply
∆GDP
GDP
∣∣∣∣
steady−growth
= ψrr. (31)
The following proposition, proved in the Appendix, establishes that the Cobb-Douglas case is
the only one consistent with the a priori assumptions.
Proposition 6 If ρc,s 6= 0, then it is not possible to simultaneously obtain non-vanishing leisure
and non-vanishing GDP growth in the steady-growth stage, i.e. when t→∞.
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider first that ρc,s < 0. As time goes by,
Br and Bsc increase, which lowers the (total) relative price of standard commodities. This obtains
because the complementarity between consumption and leisure keeps a1 always positive, which
in turn implies that BscFa1 is growing unboundedly. In fact, if Br and Bsc are increasing, a1
will also necessarily increase (income effect more than offsets substitution effect). This is however
inconsistent with transformational effort r (and thus GDP growth) not converging to zero. Assume
otherwise. Then consumption Brr would go to infinity as Br increases. But since leisure has an
upper bound by construction, an infinite quantity of consumption is not optimal when these two
goods are complementary. It follows that consumption will be finite and thus r needs to converge
to zero. If complementarity is present, it does not compensate for agents to increase consumption
beyond a certain level, and so at some point (almost) all time is devoted to leisure.13
13However, r still needs to be slightly positive to obtain strictly positive consumption. But note that r converging
to zero is not inconsistent with Brr growing.
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Consider now that ρc,s > 0. If there were no transaction costs and as Br increases, agents
would start substituting away from leisure; until they converge to a scenario where they only work
and consume (and so we would end up with vanishing leisure). This obtains because an increase
in Br lowers, ceteris paribus, the price of standard commodities and the substitution effect more
than offsets the income effect, since ρc,s > 0. When transaction costs are present, as agents start
substituting away from leisure, they inadvertently increase transaction costs, because social capital
is declining. Nevertheless, it turns out that as time passes, Bsc is growing at a fast enough rate and
so at some point transaction costs do become endogenously irrelevant;14 and it must be the case
that leisure converges to zero.
Given the discussion above, we assume ρc,s = 0 for the remainder of the paper. Next we consider
three distinct cases:
1. Fast accumulation of transformational productivity, i.e. Br grows faster than Bsc,
such that
lim
t→∞
Bsc,t
Br,t
= 0;
2. Fast accumulation of social productivity, i.e. Bsc grows faster than Br, such that
lim
t→∞
Br,t
Bsc,t
= 0;
3. Balanced accumulation, i.e. Br and Bsc keep the same order of magnitude, such that
lim
t→∞
Bsc,t
Br,t
∈ (0,∞).
In all three cases we conjecture that the following holds:
lim
t→∞
Br,t = lim
t→∞
Bsc,t =∞,
since this directly follows from the a priori restrictions and the laws of motion (16) and (17).
14Note that it is possible to have a1 converging to zero and BscFa1 growing.
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2.4.1 Fast accumulation of transformational productivity
Dividing the numerator and denominator of equation (9) by Br, one immediately obtains that r
converges to zero under the assumption of fast accumulation of transformational productivity. If
Br is accumulating relatively fast, then it is trade that becomes the main obstacle to increasing
consumption. Accordingly, agents devote all non-leisure time to trade. However, this implies that
this scenario is not compatible with the a priori restriction of non-vanishing GDP growth and we
will thus not investigate this case further.
2.4.2 Fast accumulation of social productivity
Dividing the numerator and denominator of equation (9) by Bsc, and under the assumption of fast
accumulation of social productivity, transformational effort converges to
r = 1− a1
[(
1
β
) 1
1−ρs
+ F
]
= 1− a0 − Fa1, (32)
which implies that now transaction costs (or time spent trading) converge to zero. The main obstacle
to growth is now transformation, not trade efficiency. Steady-growth levels of transformational effort
(and thus steady-growth levels of GDP growth) vary positively with the number of social ties F .
This result mirrors what we had already obtained in the static analysis of section 2.3.2.
2.4.3 Balanced accumulation
Considering the result of vanishing transaction costs makes the last scenario perhaps not very
reasonable; especially considering empirical trends.15 In this section we explore the implications of
assuming that the relative level of Br and Bsc converges to a finite, strictly positive constant, a case
which we term as balanced accumulation. Let us denote the finite, non-zero limit of Bsc/Br by µ,
i.e.
µ := lim
t→∞
Bsc,t
Br,t
. (33)
15See section 3.
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It follows that the following is true as well:
lim
t→∞
[
Bsc,t+1
Br,t+1
− Bsc,t
Br,t
]
= 0⇔
lim
t→∞
[
Bsc,t (1 + ψs)
Br,t (1 + ψrrt)
− Bsc,t
Br,t
]
= 0⇔
µ lim
t→∞
[
(1 + ψs)
(1 + ψrrt)
− 1
]
= 0⇔
lim
t→∞
rt =
ψs
ψr
(34)
The following proposition (proved in the Appendix) and corollary 1 contain the key results of
this section.
Proposition 7 The following statements are true under the balanced accumulation assumption, in
the steady-growth stage:
1. Long-run transformational effort converges to
r =
ψs
ψr
. (35)
2. For the balanced accumulation regime to hold, ψr needs to verify the lower bound defined below:
ψr > ψs
F [φ+ (1− φ)β] +
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
φ
[
F +
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
] =: ψr, (36)
otherwise the scenario of fast accumulation of social productivity obtains.
Corollary 1 Under balanced accumulation, long-run GDP growth is independent of F .
The result in corollary 1 contrasts with the short-run effects of social ties, where a higher F was
associated with higher transformational effort r. Moreover, this also implies that even if countries
initially diverge in terms of growth rates, they must necessarily converge.
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The following corollary, illustrated in figure 2, emphasizes that long-run GDP growth is a non-
trivial function of the speed at which transformational productivity grows.
Corollary 2 Under balanced accumulation, long-run GDP growth ψrr corresponds to ψs, and so
does not depend (locally) on ψr. If one gradually decreases ψr, then long-run growth is constant
until the threshold ψr; and afterwards the balanced accumulation regime collapses and long-run GDP
growth varies with ψr, as in the scenario with fast accumulation of social productivity.
[Figure 2 about here.]
When ψr is low, consumption is growing slowly (relative to social productivity). This implies
that total transaction costs cease to matter in the limit, since social productivity Bsc is increasing
and lowering the per-unit-of-trade transaction cost at a (relatively) fast rate. All non-leisure time
is thus devoted to transformational effort, and this share is a function of the relative preference
of consumption over leisure. The right panel of figure 2 shows that as ψr increases from 0, so
does long-run GDP growth. The proportionality obtains because r is constant. As ψr becomes
large enough, transaction costs start to matter and a different long-run equilibrium obtains. In this
equilibrium, non-leisure time is allocated between time spent trading and time spent transforming,
and long-run GDP growth is constant. This barrier to growth obtains because very strong increases
in consumption necessarily create high total transaction costs. Long-run growth thus becomes
a trivial function of ψs (the rate at which trade efficiency increases), which obtains by simply
multiplying expression (35) by ψr.
Another implication of the model that is shown in the right panel of figure 2 is that the long-
run difference in growth rates between low-social-ties countries and high-social-ties countries only
obtains for low ψr. When both countries are in an equilibrium with fast accumulation of social
productivity (low ψr), the difference in growth rates is simply the outcome that agents in high-
social-ties countries choose lower leisure shares, as discussed in section 2.3.2.
Finally we wish to analyze what the model predicts in terms of the relative weight of the
transaction sector in the economy. Empirically we find a strong association between social ties and
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the size of the transaction sector, in the cross section of countries (detailed in section 3). Proposition
8 shows that this is predicted by the model for the steady-growth stage.
Proposition 8 Under the balanced accumulation assumption, the weight of the transaction sector
in the economy is given by
TC
r + TC
= 1− ψs
ψr

F [φ+ (1− φ)β] +
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
φ
[
F +
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
]
 =
ψs
ψr
ψr. (37)
Expression (37) varies positively with F .
This result is perhaps counter-intuitive, in that high-social-ties economies trade more efficiently.
But these economies also grow at a faster rate and accordingly exhibit larger trading volumes. This
effect is predicted by the model to dominate in the long-run.
3 Quantitative implications
In this section we first calibrate the model using data for the United States and then simulate
development paths for other countries with respect to which we have social ties’ data. We make
the strong assumption that the only difference in primitives between countries at t = 0 (the year
1700 in data) is the number of social ties F and that this number remains constant across time
(culture). One period of time in the model corresponds to 20 years in data, and we interpret each
period’s decisions as the decisions of individuals in a generation.
Before getting into the numerical exploration, we would like to offer three reasons why we
consider it useful. First, we are interested in the transition towards the steady state of countries
with different number of ties, and it is not clear a priori how that works. Second, we are interested
in fleshing out the most relevant quantitative predictions of the model, and recognizing which
dimensions of the data are and which are not being accounted by the model. Third, by focusing in
the quantitative aspects of the model, we can discern where we need more and better data.
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3.1 Calibration
There are a total of 9 parameters to calibrate: F , Br,0, Bsc,0, ψr, ψs, α, β, ρs, and φ. First note
that α and Br,0 are not separately identified, since it is the term αBr that determines r, as shown in
equation (9). Given our multiplicative law of motion for Br given by (17), we are indeed specifying
a law of motion for αBr. Thus we set α = 1. Also, given our data it is not possible to separately
identify β and ρs, so we set ρs = 0.5. To identify all parameters except Br,0 and Bsc,0, we use the
data in table 1. We also assume that the United States is close to the steady-growth stage in the
year 2000.
[Table 1 about here.]
Our estimate for the number of social ties comes directly from data and we set F = 8. The
equilibrium relationship between a0 (time spent alone) and a1 (average time per social tie) is given
by equation (11), being determined by ρs and β. We already specified a value for ρs and so the
relative levels of a0 and a1 in data immediately imply β = 0.16. Next, using the equilibrium level
of a1, given by equation (13), we are able to determine that φ = 0.18. According to our assumption
that the United States is close to the steady-growth stage, we can equate expression (35) multiplied
by ψr to our estimate of long-run growth. This yields ψs = 0.35. Next, equating expression (35) to
the value of r in data implies ψr = 1.96. The only two parameters left to determine are the initial
values for productivities. We require two conditions regarding the calibration of these parameters.
First, that the observed growth rate between 1750 and 1990 matches data; Lucas (2002) estimates
the ratio of real per capita GDP in 1990 relative to 1750 at 21.6. Second, we require that our choice
for initial productivities is consistent with the assumption that the US is close to the steady-growth
stage. Our final choice was to set Br,0 = 0.7 and Bsc,0 = 4.2. A summary of the calibration is
contained in table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
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Table 3 shows a sensitivity analysis for different pairs of (Br,0, Bsc,0). The most important
magnitude we want to match is the variation in output between 1750 and 1990, especially given the
nature of our simulation exercise. Thus we only consider calibrations that generate this result. The
assumption that the US is close to the steady-growth stage would require that the transformational
effort in the year 2000 generated by the model is close to 0.18. Note that for lower levels of initial
productivities this becomes less the case. Another important feature of the data is that the weight of
the transaction sector increased significantly from 1900 to 2000. The model is not able to capture
this, but if we interpret this pattern as a generalized increase of the weight of the transaction
sector over time, then for low levels of initial productivities this qualitative aspect does obtain, if
instead we compare the year 1700 with later years (1900 or 2000). In that sense we would say that
the model does not match the rate at which the weight of the transaction sector increased. This
argument notwithstanding, low levels of initial productivity are not consistent with the US being
close to a steady-growth stage and so we face a trade-off. We compromised by setting Br,0 = 0.7
and Bsc,0 = 4.2 (bold-faced in table 3).
Although not the main focus of the paper, the fact that the model predicts an increase in the
weight of the transaction sector speaks directly to the questions raised in Wallis and North (1986)
(pg. 125): “The growing size of the transaction sector poses a major explanatory challenge to
economists and economic historians. What is the relationship of those inputs to their outputs? How
have transaction and transformation costs interacted in the transformation of the economy?” What
our model says is that the initial levels of social and transformational productivities play a major
role in the observed subsequent pattern of the relative shares of transaction and transformation
sectors (see table 3).
3.2 Results
As explained before, we consider that all countries had the same productivities in the year 1700,
although different levels of social ties. We assume the latter were kept constant across time, thus
we can use data from the International Social Survey Programme 2001 to calibrate the value of F
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for each country. All other parameters are set at the levels presented in table 2. The main result is
depicted in figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Not surprisingly, given the theoretical results, the model predicts a positive association between
the number of social ties and income per capita in the year 2000 (or, equivalently, the average
growth rate of the economy). The correlation coefficient between the model’s prediction and data
is 0.58. The coefficients of variation of income per capita are surprisingly similar, 0.43 in the data
and 0.41 in the model.
Given that two channels drive our theoretical results (social capital and preferences), we ask
which one is more relevant. We analyze this by running the experiment of simulating development
paths with Bsc = 0, i.e. shutting down the productivity of social capital. Computing again the
coefficient of variation generated by the model we obtain 0.20, roughly half the benchmark value of
0.41. This means that both channels, preferences and social capital, are quantitatively important
in terms of explaining cross-sectional development patterns.16
The next step is to investigate how the model fares in other dimensions. We consider cross-
sectional dimensions first, and follow later with time series dimensions. Two other cross-sectional
dimensions are worth inspecting. The first one refers to the strength of ties. Respondents in the
ISSP survey answered the following question: “How often did you visit or see your closest friend?”
There were eight possible ordered answers, from “he/she lives in the same household” to “never”.
We consider the answer to this question as a proxy for the time that respondents dedicate to each
close friend. Figure 4 shows that the model does a reasonable job at capturing this aspect: in
both model and data, countries with larger number of ties tend to have lower strength of ties.
The correlation coefficient between the model’s prediction and data is 0.40 and it may be worth
mentioning that, in both model and data, the correlation between strength of ties and income per
16Of course, growth with zero productivity of social capital would be much lower; GDP per capita of the US would
have grown between 1750 and 1990 at an annual rate of 0.65% instead of a rate of 1.3%. This is due to the fact that
a large share of the market resources (by the year 2000, almost 90% instead of near 47% in the benchmark case)
could have been allocated to the transactional instead of the transformational sector.
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capita is also negative.17 We do not compare coefficients of variation in model and data, since our
empirical proxy is ordinal.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
The second additional cross-sectional dimension we are interested in is the share of effort ded-
icated to transactional services vis a` vis transformational effort. In figure 5 we observe that the
model, above a small threshold, captures the increase in the share of transactional effort associated
with large number of ties (and high income per capita), although the slope is flatter in the model
(prediction for the year 2000) than in the data. The correlation coefficient between the model’s
prediction and data is 0.56. In this case, as can be readily observed from the figure, the coefficients
of variation in share of transaction sector differ markedly, 0.21 in the data and 0.03 in the model.
The prediction of a positive relationship between number of ties and the share of the transaction
sector is not obvious. Indeed, from a superficial inspection of the model, one would conclude that
countries with relatively large number of ties would have a low share of transaction services, as
ties translate into social capital. This is, in fact, the case in the initial periods. But soon enough,
countries with large number of ties grow faster (due to higher transformational productivity), and
need to allocate a larger share of resources in the trading of that additional production. By 2000,
the relationship between number of ties and share of transactional effort in total effort is positive.
It must be said that, in the limit (dashed line in figure 5), this feature is accentuated with slopes
being quite similar in data and model. In fact, while the correlation coefficient between data and
model remains similar, in the limit the coefficient of variation is much closer to the data (0.19). In
this sense, the calibrated model seems not to be capturing accurately the timing of some changes.
With respect to the time series dimensions, we have already showed that the model is not able
to capture the steep increase in transaction costs between 1900 and 2000 for the US, if one wants to
match the average growth rate between 1750 and 1990. On the other hand, the model is consistent
17In data this coefficient is −0.65, statistically significant at 0.1%. See bottom part of table 6 in Appendix for all
correlations between variables.
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with effort share of time being almost constant at near 0.30. This constancy in shares is, of course,
given by the unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 also shows that growth rates for the US economy were higher in the period 1900-1990
than in the period 1750-1900, unlike what is predicted by the model, with similar growth rates
in both periods. This counter-factual dimension would certainly disappear if the model separated
between schooling (investment in human capital) and labor, with the former driving a large share
of the inter-temporal increase in productivity.18 However, we do not have reason to believe this
would change our cross-sectional results, which are the focus of the paper. Moreover, the model
can account for a large share of the “great divergence” in income per capita. Using data from
Lucas (2002) we are able to compute the coefficient of variation of income per capita for a set of
21 regions/countries and conclude that this magnitude increased 4.05 times from 1750 to 1990.
The calibrated version of the model generates a 2.3-fold increase in the coefficient over the same
period, although for our set of 27 countries (which somewhat limits the quantitative comparability).
Finally, the last row in table 4 shows that both model (our 27 countries) and data (the 21 regions
in Lucas (2002)) exhibit a decrease in the heterogeneity of growth rates (convergence).
4 Extension: agent-level social capital
A strong assumption made in the paper is that agents are not able to influence their social capital.
This section will try to make a case for why we believe this assumption is relatively innocuous. We
start by alternatively assuming that both agent-level and aggregate decisions matter for the social
capital—and thus the transaction costs—faced by agent i, i.e.
SCi =
(∑
j 6=i
sij
)τ (∑
k 6=i
∑
j 6=i skj
N − 1
)1−τ
. (38)
18This is due to the fact that, while total effort seems to have remained rather constant in time, schooling time
has increased monotonically.
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According to the expression above, an agent’s social capital depends on how well-connected she is
and how well-connected all other agents are. The relative importance of the former is gaged by
τ . The intuition behind this is that an agent can only extract benefits from the global network if
she establishes access to the network via her own links; and that the benefits of the network the
agent is accessing are a function of how dense the network is. The question becomes: How does
this alternative specification of social capital change the incentives to socialize? The first step in
answering this is computing the derivative of social capital with respect to aij, i.e. the time devoted
by i in the relationship with j:
∂SCi
∂aij
= τ
(∑
j 6=i
sij
)τ−1
βaβ−1ij a
1−β
ji
(∑
k 6=i
∑
j 6=i skj
N − 1
)1−τ
(39)
First notice from the expression above that it is still the case that multiple equilibria are allowed,
since aji = 0 makes the derivative also zero, which in turn makes aij = 0 still optimal (as under the
initial assumption). If we solve for a symmetric equilibrium with F ties and aij = a1, then equation
(39) becomes
τ (Fa1)
τ−1 βaβ−11 a
1−β
1 (Fa1)
1−τ = τβ. (40)
The product τβ involves two magnitudes below unity, which makes it naturally a small number.
Moreover, in market economies where it is more unlikely that the agents know who they are going
to interact with, it is probably more reasonable to assume that τ is relatively low, i.e aggregate
connectedness being more important. These arguments notwithstanding, it is still possible that the
transaction costs of agent i become so high—since trade volume is increasing significantly—that
marginal decisions are importantly affected. Recall that transaction costs are borne by the buyer
and amount to
TCi =
αci
1 +BscSCi
=
αBrri
1 +BscSCi
.
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If we divide the numerator and denominator of the expression above by Br and consider later stages
of development (i.e. Br is large), then transaction costs are approximately
TCi ≈ αri
µSCi
, (41)
where µ is the limit for the ratio Bs/Br. If we assume a balanced accumulation path in order to
be consistent with the empirical fact that the transaction sector is not vanishing, then µ belongs
to the interval (0,∞). Since ri is bounded from above at 1, then the (absolute) marginal influence
that an agent can have in her transaction costs via time chosen to be spent in ties is bounded from
above at
α
µSC2i
τβ, (42)
even as consumption grows towards infinity. Moreover, SCi is bounded away from 0, since the
consumption motive for social ties by itself makes a1—and thus equilibrium social capital Fa1—
strictly positive. In words, in a model like ours where agents are already building social capital as
an externality of consuming social relationships, it is not clear that there subsists a strong incentive
to further increase time spent socializing in order just to reduce transaction costs. We numerically
solved for the steady-growth stage outcomes of an extended model that includes this additional
motive, using the calibrated parameters from section 3. The results are shown in table 5.19
[Table 5 about here.]
For any τ there is not a change in the order of magnitude of social capital (recall that social
capital is proportional to a1). This is true for both low-social-ties economies (F = 3, the smallest in
our sample) and high-social-ties societies (F = 11, the highest in our sample). Moreover, we do not
observe low-social-ties economies being significantly more responsive to increases in τ , which would
be necessary to overturn our argument that dispersion in F drives dispersion in growth rates.
19We still assume balanced accumulation and unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and total
leisure, otherwise the a priori restrictions would not be verified.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
We present a general equilibrium model where agents derive utility from relationships and time spent
socializing generates a positive externality in terms of transaction costs. While it is a fairly intuitive
result that the model predicts a positive association between social capital (i.e. lower transaction
costs) and development, it is perhaps unexpected that the relationship building mechanism by itself
would produce the same effect. Furthermore, our calibration suggests that this second channel is
quantitatively important. In this sense, our paper adds to the literature not only by providing a
conceptually clear and quantitatively grounded analysis of social capital and development, but also
by highlighting how social and economic dimensions may importantly interact in less obvious ways.
A key assumption of our model is that different countries display different average levels of social
ties, which remain constant across time. This can be seen as a product of culture, an interpretation
which is consistent with the multiple equilibria predicted by the model. This argument notwith-
standing, country cross-sectional variation in the average number of social ties can also be seen as
resulting from variation in some fixed cost of establishing a relationship. For the purpose of deriving
a connection between social ties and economic development in the context of our model, either of
these stories is admissible, as long as time variation in social ties is sufficiently small. Ideally we
would empirically inspect variation in social ties across long periods, but such data is not available.
There is however some evidence we can present in support of our hypothesis, shown in figure 6.
[Figure 6 about here.]
The figure depicts the median level of social ties for a subset of countries where social ties’ data
was collected both in 1986 and 2001. If our hypothesis were true, then the plot would correspond
to the 45-degree line. However, we observe that for most countries, the median level of social ties
in 2001 is greater or equal than the value in 1986. We believe that this may be explained by a
difference in the questionnaire.20 Abstracting from the difference in averages, the ranking among
countries did not change dramatically. In fact, with the exception of the US, countries that had
20The 1986 survey asked directly how many close friends one had (question 9), while the 2001 survey asked
separately how many close friends one had at work, in the neighborhood, and elsewhere (questions 15, 16, and 17).
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more or the same close friends than countries in some subset X still maintain that property in
2001. Naturally we are only inspecting 7 countries and over a short period of time, which limits
the relevance of the data, but it seems somewhat consistent with our hypothesis that the level of
social ties, or at least the cross-sectional difference in levels, is relatively stable.
We wish to emphasize that our model of relationship building is relatively stark. Different
specifications for this dimension could generate different results, for instance if we take into account
the fact that communication and transportation costs, which have significantly decreased with
development, play a role in the ability to maintain a network of connections. Moreover, it is not
clear how technological aspects of relationship building interact with culture. Additional research
in this area would help better understand the relationship between economic development, social
ties, and social capital.
Another limitation of our framework is that in our model there are no “network architecture
concerns”, since we solve for symmetric equilibria. But in real-world social networks, where there
is strong clustering, social capital may be used to promote bad purposes, such as criminal activity
or exclusion of potential competitors. It could be argued that our model does not consider the
negative effect that may arise in high-social-ties societies, if it is the case that a higher intensity of
socialization also creates more incentives for clustering and subsequent bad uses of social capital.
Once again, further research will be necessary to better understand these trade-offs.
Finally we mention the potentially interesting implications of our approach for fiscal policy. In
our setting, a Pigouvian tax on the consumption of standard goods and/or income from trans-
formational effort could potentially be welfare-enhancing for two reasons: (i) such taxation could
minimize the equilibrium underinvestment in relationships, by reducing the value of each individ-
ual’s outside option for non-social uses of time; and (ii) it could partially internalize the benefits of
social relationships associated with the positive externality on transaction costs. One could addi-
tionally consider fiscal policies aimed at inter-generational effects. It is also likely that our model
would predict specific optimal fiscal policies for each type of society, which could be an additional
testable implication of our framework.
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A Appendix
A.1 Solution to the static problem
The Lagrangian for any agent i is given by:
Li =
φcρc,si + (1− φ)
{∑
j
(
aβija
1−β
ji
)ρs} ρc,sρs 
1
ρc,s
− (A.1)
θi
[
ri +
(
α
1 +BscSC
)
ci +
∑
j
aij − 1
]
− λi [ci −Brri] + (A.2)∑
j
ηa,ijaij + ηr,iri, (A.3)
where θ, λ, and η are Lagrange multipliers for the relevant constraints (η’s are associated with
non-negativity constraints for aij and ri). Assuming a symmetric equilibrium where aii = a0,
aij = a1 > 0 for j in the set of i’s friendships (totaling F ), aij = 0 for j not in the set of i’s
friendships, ri = r, and ci = c, the first-order conditions of the problem may be simplified into the
following two equations (agent subscript omitted):
φcρc,s−1
(1− φ) [aρs0 + Faρs1 ]
ρc,s
ρs
−1 aρs−10
=
α
1 +BscFa1
+
1
Br
(A.4)
a0
a1
=
(
1
β
) 1
1−ρs
, (A.5)
The budget and time constraints are
c = Brr (A.6)
r +
(
α
1 +BscFa1
)
c+ a0 + Fa1 = 1. (A.7)
Combining (A.4)-(A.7) we obtain an implicit expression for a1:
φ [Brr
∗(a1)]
ρc,s−1
(1− φ)β
[(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
+ F
] ρc,s
ρs
−1
a
ρc,s−1
1
=
α
1 +BscFa1
+
1
Br
, (A.8)
where r∗(a1) is given by equation (9).
A.2 Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Since we are interested in symmetric equilibria, we can derive the solution
using the following simpler problem, that is isomorphic to the general one under the assumption of
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symmetry. Any agent maximizes the following CES utility function
U(r, a0, a1) =
{
φBρc,sr r
ρc,s + (1− φ)
[
aρs0 + Fa
βρs
1 a¯
(1−β)ρs
] ρc,s
ρs
} 1
ρc,s
, (A.9)
subject to the time constraint
r + TC + a0 + Fa
β
1 a¯
1−β = 1. (A.10)
The agent knows that only F other agents will pay her some attention (i.e. a¯ > 0), and so already
optimally decided to not pay attention to any other agent outside her set of friends (note that time
is valuable, so this is not just a weak best response). As long as φ < 1 and β > 0, this is a standard
concave programming problem with a unique interior solution (derivatives with respect to r, a0,
and a1 are all infinity at 0). An equilibrium is defined by requiring
a∗1(a¯, ...) = a¯.
Next we need to establish that there exists  > 0 small enough such that
a∗1(, ...) > .
To see that this is true, let us compute the following:
∂
[
aβρs1 a¯
(1−β)ρs
]
∂a1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
a¯=a1=
= βρsa
(βρs−1)
1 a¯
(1−β)ρs
∣∣∣
a¯=a1=
=
βρs
1−ρs
(A.11)
Expression (A.11) goes to infinity as  goes to zero, which implies that marginal utility of a1 also
does. This is not consistent with optimizing behavior, so it must be the case that for small enough
a¯, a∗1 > a¯ will obtain. Thus it follows that for small ,
a∗1(a¯, ...) ∈ [, 1/F ],∀a¯ ∈ [, 1/F ],
where we are also making use of the time constraint when setting the upper bound of a∗1 at 1/F .
By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point in [, 1/F ]. This concludes establishing
existence of an equilibrium where a positive amount of time is devoted to each of the F friends, for
any finite F . To show that this equilibrium is unique, construct the homotopy function H : [, 1/F ]
× [0, 1] → R with
H(a¯, t) = a∗1(a¯, ...;α = t× α¯)− a¯,
where α¯, set exogenously, denotes the true level of transaction costs. Setting t = 0 reduces to
the case with no transaction costs, where H(a¯, t = 0) = 0 has a unique solution (see proposition
2; and note that all equilibrium magnitudes besides a1 are uniquely determined by a1, as shown
in proposition 1). Also, we have shown that an equilibrium exists for any level of transaction
costs, which implies that there exists a solution to H(a¯, t) = 0, for any t. Thus, H is continuously
differentiable in a¯ and t, which means that the solution to H(a¯, t) = 0 is a continuously differentiable
function of t. Combining this with the uniqueness of the solution at t = 0 implies that the solution
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for any t ∈ (0, 1] is also unique.21 It follows that there is a unique solution to H(a¯, t = 1) = 0, for
any α¯; or equivalently, our equilibrium is unique.
Proof of proposition 2. Setting α = 0(ρc,s = 0) in the general expression (A.8) yields point 1(2)
in the proposition.
Proof of proposition 6. Using the first-order conditions, the relation between consumption c and
per-friend attention a1 may be written as
a
1−ρc,s
1 c
ρc,s = (1− a0 − Fa1)
(
1− φ
φ
)
β
[(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
+ F
] ρc,s
ρs
−1
. (A.12)
If GDP growth is non-vanishing, then c→∞. If ρc,s < 0 this implies that the LHS of (A.12) goes
to zero, since a1 has an exogenous upper bound of 1. The only way to make the RHS of (A.12)
equal to zero is to set (a0 + Fa1) = 1. However, this implies that r = 0, which is inconsistent with
non-vanishing GDP growth. Consider now that ρc,s > 0. Since the RHS of (A.12) is always finite,
it would be necessary that a1 = 0, which implies vanishing leisure.
Proof of proposition 7. Dividing the numerator and denominator of equation (9) by Br, and
under the balanced accumulation assumption, yields the following expression for long-run transfor-
mational effort:
r =
1− a1Y
1 + α
µFa1
, (A.13)
where
Y :=
(
1
β
) 1
1−ρs
+ F. (A.14)
We know that in the long-run, as long as µ > 0 (which holds under balanced accumulation),
ψs
ψr
= r =
1− a1Y
1 + α
µFa1
,
which yields, after a few steps of algebra,
µ =
α
Fa1
[
(1− a1Y )ψrψs − 1
] . (A.15)
Requiring µ > 0 (necessary for balanced accumulation) and using equation (A.15) gives the lower
bound for ψr in expression (36). This implies that we shift to the scenario with fast accumulation
of social productivity when ψr is low enough. To see that this is the case, first note that for ψr
small enough, µ becomes negative, which is not consistent with the fact that Bsc and Br are both
non-negative (recall: µ is defined as the limit of the ratio Bsc/Br). Then it must be the case that
for low ψr, either the scenario with fast accumulation of transformational productivity obtains, or
the scenario with fast accumulation of social productivity obtains. Assume it is the former, which
implies that Bsc/Br converges to zero. Then it cannot be the case that there exists some t
∗, such
21See Garcia and Zangwill (1982) for a textbook introduction to the use of homotopies in solving equilibrium
problems.
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that for all t > t∗ the following holds:
Bsc,t+1
Br,t+1
>
Bsc,t
Br,t
⇔ rt < ψs
ψr
But such a t∗ is guaranteed to exist, since we showed in section 2.4.1 that rt converges to zero under
the assumption of fast accumulation of transformational productivity. This contradiction implies
that it is the scenario with fast accumulation of social productivity that obtains for low enough
ψr.
Proof of proposition 8. The size of the transaction sector in the steady-growth stage is given by
TC = lim
t→∞
(
αBrr
1 +BscSC
)
=
αψs
ψrµFa1
, (A.16)
where µ is given by (A.15) and we made use of the fact that r = ψs/ψr. The relative weight of the
transaction sector may then be written as
TC
TC + r
=
αψs
ψrµFa1(1− a1Y ) , (A.17)
where Y is given in (A.14). Simplification of the expression above yields equation (37) in the
proposition. To show that the weight of the transaction sector varies positively with F it is sufficient
to prove the following:
∂
∂F

F [φ+ (1− φ)β] +
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
φ
[
F +
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
]
 < 0⇔
[φ+ (1− φ)β]
[
F +
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs
]
< F [φ+ (1− φ)β] +
(
1
β
) ρs
1−ρs ⇔
φ+ (1− φ)β < 1,
which always holds, since β and φ belong to the open unit interval.
A.3 Data
Data on number of social ties, strength of ties, and share of employment in transaction sector have
been obtained from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). This program includes two
chapters on social networks, one for the year 1986 and another for the year 2001. In this paper we
have in all cases used the data for the year 2001, with the exception made for the construction of
figure 6, in which we used data for both years. In its chapter of the year 2001 (ZA No. 3680), around
37,000 individuals in 27 countries were asked, among other questions, about number and frequency
of contacts with different types of agents: family members, friends, and secondary associations.
The number of friends’ ties for each individual was calculated summing variables v23r, v24r, and
v25r (respectively, number of close friends at work, at their neighborhood, and other close friends).
Then we took the median value for each country. The number of nuclear family ties, for each
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individual, was calculated summing variables v4r (number of brothers and sisters), v8r (number
of adult sons and daughters), v66r (number of children aged 18 or less), plus 2 for father and
mother. Then we took the median value for each country. The number of secondary associations’
ties was calculated first separating if a person participates or not in a particular association, which
is informed for seven types of them (political party (v29), union (v30), religious organization (v31),
sports/hobby clubs (v32), charitable organization (v33), neighborhood organization (v34), and
other associations (v35)). Then we counted the number of associations in which each individual
participates; and then we took the average for each country.
The strength of friends’ ties was calculated using variable v27, which asks “how often do you visit
or see your closest friend?”. The answers go from “he/she lives in same household” (1), “daily” (2),
“at least several times a week” (3), up to “never” (8). We recoded the answers such that a higher
number means a higher frequency of visits, and took the average for each country.
The share of employment in transaction sector was calculated following the classification used
by Wallis and North (1986), appendix, section 1, by which occupation categories are classified
into transaction-related and the rest. The main categories in the former group are sales workers,
clerk workers, foremen, some professional workers (accountants, lawyers, etc.) and some protective
workers (police, guards, etc.). In the ISSP (2001) the variable of interest is labeled isco88 (as it
follows the 4 digit classification of the International Labour Organization). For each country, we
counted the number of individuals that indicated that they worked in a transaction-related sector,
and divided that number by the total of individuals that informed their occupation. The surveys
in Austria, France, Italy, Slovenia, and South Africa did not inform this variable.
The data for shares of time use in table 1 was calculated using Ramey and Francis (2009), and are
averages for population of age 10 and more. In their study, time use is divided into six categories:
market work, home work, schooling, leisure, personal care, and travel. We calculated shares over
a total that excludes personal care and travel. We considered effort (r + TC) to be the sum of
market work and schooling. This total is separated into transactional and transformational effort
using the share employment in transaction sector for the United States obtained above (0.392).
Leisure time is separated in two categories, social activities and non-social leisure, using data for
the year 1985 provided by Robinson and Godbey (1997). They decompose leisure (free time) into
its components (see figure 12 in their chapter 8 and table 13 in their chapter 11). We considered
social activities (Fa1) as the sum of (according to their classification) “socializing”, “religion”, and
“other organizations”. Out of 37.4 weekly hours (free time informed by the authors minus adult
education time), 8.8 hours correspond to social activities. (This number is remarkably similar to a
raw average of socializing time in Aguiar and Hurst (2007), 9.04 weekly hours for the year 2003).
We calculated then that social activities represent almost 24% of leisure time. Non-social leisure
plus home work is considered household time (a0).
[Table 6 about here.]
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Figure 1: Social Ties and Income per Capita: Cross-Country Comparison. The figure plots, for each
country, the median number of “close friends” (source: International Social Survey Programme, 2001) versus the
income per capita in the year 2000 (source: Penn World Table), normalized by the income per capita for the United
States. The sample correlation between social ties and income per capita is 0.58, statistically significant at 0.1%.
Data is provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Long-run Outcomes as a Function of Speed of Accumulation of Transformational Produc-
tivity. Left panel: shows long-run transformational effort r for low-social-ties countries (F = 3) and high-social-ties
countries (F = 11), for varying ψr. Right panel: shows long-run GDP growth ψrr for low-social-ties countries
(F = 3) and high-social-ties countries (F = 11), for varying ψr. The remaining parameters are set at the following
levels: β = 0.2, φ = 0.35, ρs = 0.5, ψs = 0.03.
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Figure 3: Social Ties and Income per Capita: Data (dots) and Model Prediction (solid line). The
figure plots, for each country, the median number of close friends (source: International Social Survey Programme,
2001) versus the income per capita in the year 2000 (source: Penn World Table), normalized by the income per
capita for the United States. In data, the correlation coefficient between number of ties and income per capita is
0.58, statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Data is provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 4: Number of Social Ties and Strength of Ties: Data (dots) and Model Prediction (solid
line). The figure plots, for each country, the median number of close friends (source: International Social Survey
Programme, 2001) versus the average strength of ties (same source). In data, the correlation coefficient between
number and strength of ties is −0.30, statistically significant at the 10% level. Data is provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Social Ties and Share of Transaction Sector: Data and Model Prediction. The figure plots, for
each country, the median number of close friends (source: International Social Survey Programme, 2001) versus the
share of transaction sector employment in total employment (same source, using Wallis and North (1986) methodol-
ogy). In data, the correlation coefficient between number of ties and share of transaction sector is 0.57, statistically
significant at the 0.5% level. Data is provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 6: Time Variation in Social Ties. The figure plots, for each country, the median number of social ties
in 1986 and 2001(source: International Social Survey Programme, 1986 and 2001).
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Table 1: Data Used for Calibration (US, year 2000). The number of social ties comes from the International
Social Survey Programme 2001 (ISSP 2001). Shares of time use constructed from Ramey and Francis (2009) and
Robinson and Godbey (1997), and excludes time for sleep, personal care, and travel. Share of transformational effort,
relative to transactional effort, constructed using employment data in ISSP 2001, using the classification of Wallis
and North (1986). See Appendix for details. The estimate for steady-state growth corresponds to the average level
of real per capita GDP growth for the US, for the period 2000-2007 (source: Penn World Table).
Description Value
Number of social ties (F ) 8
Share of transformational effort (r) 0.18
Share of transactional effort (TC) 0.11
Share of time in social activities (Fa1) 0.12
Share of non-social leisure plus home work (a0) 0.59
Steady-state annual growth rate ((1 + ψrr)
1/20 − 1) 1.5%
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Table 2: Calibration Summary. Shows the calibrated parameters using United States data.
Parameter Value
α 1.00
ρs 0.50
β 0.16
φ 0.18
ψs 0.35
ψr 1.96
Br,0 0.7
Bsc,0 4.2
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Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis of Initial Productivities. Shows how the choice of initial productivities Br,0
and Bsc,0 impacts several outputs of the model. r corresponds to the share of time dedicated to effort in the
transformational sector; TC stands for the share of time dedicated to effort in the transaction sector. N.a. stands for
not available. Data sources: Wallis and North (1986), Lucas (2002), Ramey and Francis (2009), and International
Social Survey Programme 2001.
Br,0 Bsc,0 GDP1990/GDP1750 r2000 TC1700 TC1900 TC2000
0.1 0.31 21.6 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.18
0.7 4.2 21.6 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.14
3 17.3 21.6 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.13
Data 21.6 0.18 n.a. 0.05 0.11
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Table 4: Additional Comparisons of Model and Data. The table compares magnitudes observed in data with
predictions of the model. IPC stands for income per capita and G for average annual growth rates in IPC. CV
stands for coefficient of variation and captures the dispersion in IPC or G among countries/regions. Sources for
data construction: Lucas (2002) and Ramey and Francis (2009).
Magnitude Model Data
Effort share of time, US 1900 0.29 0.30
Annual growth rate IPC 1900-1990, US 1.29% 1.70%
Annual growth rate IPC 1750-1900, US 1.28% 1.04%
CVIPC,1990/CVIPC,1750 2.30 4.05
CVG,1900−1990/CVG,1750−1900 0.79 0.44
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Table 5: Steady-Growth Outcomes for Varying Levels of the Private-Good Component of Social
Capital. We used the calibrated parameters from section 3 and solved numerically for steady-growth equilibrium
outcomes in high- and low-social-ties economies in the extended model where social capital has a private good
component (with weight of τ) and a public good component (with weight of (1− τ)).
F = 3 F = 11
τ a1 ∆ vs. τ = 0 (%) a1 ∆ vs. τ = 0 (%)
0.0 0.0183 – 0.0136 –
0.2 0.0193 +5.5 0.0142 +4.4
0.5 0.0209 +14.2 0.0151 +11.0
0.8 0.0221 +20.8 0.0160 +17.7
1.0 0.0232 +26.8 0.0166 +22.1
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Table 6: Data. Close friends and nuclear family correspond to medians, secondary associations corresponds to
the average number of participated organizations. Strength of friends’ ties corresponds to the frequency of visits to
closest friend. Share of transaction sector corresponds to the employment share. See above for explanation of data
construction. n.a. stands for not available. Sources: International Social Survey Programme 2001 and Penn World
Table.
Country Type of tie Income
per
Capita
(2000 US
$‘000)
Strength
of
friends’
ties
Share of
transaction
sectorNuclear
family
Close
friends
Secondary
associations
United States 6 8 2.3 34.36 4.7 0.39
Norway 5 11 1.8 33.09 4.6 0.37
Switzerland 5 8 1.6 28.83 4.9 0.36
Denmark 5 8 2.1 27.83 4.5 0.36
Austria 5 7 1.4 27.00 5.1 n.a.
Canada 7 7 2.3 26.82 4.4 0.45
Australia 6 9 2.1 25.83 4.4 0.43
Germany 5 7 1.6 25.06 4.7 0.39
France 6 6 1.2 25.04 4.3 n.a.
United Kingdom 5 9 1.4 24.67 4.8 0.41
Japan 6 9 1.4 23.97 4.9 0.47
Finland 5 5 2.1 22.74 4.5 0.28
Italy 4 4 1.0 22.49 5.3 n.a.
Israel 6 8 1.1 22.24 5.3 n.a.
Cyprus 6 6 0.9 20.46 6.3 0.37
New Zealand 6 8 2.0 20.42 4.4 0.37
Spain 5 4 0.6 19.54 5.7 0.28
Slovenia 5 10 1.4 18.21 5.4 n.a.
Czech Republic 5 6 0.9 13.62 5.1 0.43
Chile 8 3 0.7 11.43 5.2 0.34
Hungary 5 3 0.4 11.38 5.5 0.26
Russia 5 4 0.4 9.26 5.5 0.25
Latvia 4 3 0.5 9.00 5.1 0.28
Poland 6 5 0.4 8.61 5.1 0.30
South Africa 6 3 1.7 8.23 5.9 n.a.
Brazil 7 8 0.7 7.19 6.1 0.24
Philippines 10 7 1.2 3.83 5.7 0.24
Correlations
Friends 0.07 1 - - - -
Sec. associations 0.06 0.56 1 - - -
Income per capita -0.35 0.58 0.69 1 - -
Strength of ties 0.19 -0.38 -0.64 -0.65 1 -
Transaction share -0.11 0.57 0.59 0.68 -0.58 1
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